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Abstract
Using longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel, this anal-
ysis suggests that the cross-sectional estimates of the returns to educa-
tional mismatch are signiﬁcantly biased when unobserved heterogene-
ity is omitted in the wage equation. The results of the standard ﬁxed
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are independent of the job requirements. Hence, this empirical analysis
supports the human capital interpretation of the Swiss labour market.
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The analyses of educational mismatch in the labour market and its conse-
quences on individual wages have never been so widespread than nowadays.1
Educational mismatch arises in the form of overeducation (i.e. workers have
more education than is required for their jobs) or undereducation (i.e. workers
have less education than is required for their jobs). Since the seminal paper by
Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981), who proposed an extension of the Mincer wage
equation in order to estimate the returns to over/required/undereducation,
the literature has generally agreed with the following two points. First, overe-
ducated workers earn less than those adequately educated with the same ed-
ucation but more than those adequately educated in the same occupation.
Second, undereducated workers earn more than those adequately educated
with the same education but less than those adequately educated in the
same occupation. Given the growing availability of panel data, some studies
have applied the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation method to Duncan and Hoﬀman’s
wage equation (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009). The main idea of this
method is to account for unobserved heterogeneity whose omission may lead
to biased estimates in cross-sectional analyses. However, neither Bauer nor
Korpi and Tåhlin have considered the fact that ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the
returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation may not
be properly identiﬁed since there is probably little or no variation in actual
education over time. The aim of this paper is to address this problem of
identiﬁcation when using ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate the returns to educational
mismatch.
How to reconcile the variation need of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator and the
time-invariant nature of actual education? Motivated by the latest meta-
analyses of studies on educational mismatch, we rely on a simpliﬁed version
of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s model proposed by Rumberger (1987) in which
years of overeducation and years of undereducation are restricted to have
symmetric eﬀects on wages. After rearranging Rumberger’s speciﬁcation, we
show that the coeﬃcient associated with required education is the diﬀeren-
1The recent review of the literature provided by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) is a
good example revealing the ongoing interest in studying this topic.
2tial rate of return between required education and educational mismatch.
Since required education is time-varying, the ﬁxed eﬀects method allows the
identiﬁcation of this coeﬃcient. The ﬁxed eﬀects results based on panel data
from Switzerland demonstrate that the wage returns to education are inde-
pendent of the job requirements, i.e. the estimated diﬀerential rate of return
is equal to zero. Hence, this empirical analysis supports the human capital
interpretation of the Swiss labour market.
The next section of this paper provides a description of the data from
the Swiss Household Panel Survey and explains how educational mismatch
is measured. Section 3 presents the modelling approaches to estimating by
ﬁxed eﬀects the returns to educational mismatch under the time-invariant
nature of actual education. The regression results are produced in Section 4
and a number of robustness checks are performed in Section 5. Section 6
discusses the signiﬁcance of our ﬁndings and proposes possible extensions.
2 Data
We use the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), which is
based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS). The
SHP is an unbalanced panel where surveyed individuals may temporarily
drop out of the sample because certain or all variables are unobserved for
some time period. It consists of two samples: the SHP_I (the sample of
households and individuals interviewed for the ﬁrst time in 1999) and the
SHP_II (a refreshment sample of "new" households included in 2004). The
individual questionnaires cover a broad range of topics, of which education
and employment are our main points of interest.2
In the empirical analysis, we restrict our ﬁnal sample to individuals who
belonged to the working age population (18-65 for men, 18-62 for women)
2Complete interview data are available for 7,799 and 3,654 individuals in 1999 and 2004,
respectively. The net response rates (referring to all called individuals minus those with
neutral problems such as invalid telephone number or foreign language) are quite high,
attaining 85% in 1999 and 76% in 2004. The random samples were stratiﬁed according
to seven large regions of Switzerland, proportionally to the number of phone connections
in the comprehensive Swiss phone directory. Interviews were carried out in German,
French and Italian using computer-assisted telephone interviewing. Further details on the
sampling methodology and questionnaires are available at www.swisspanel.ch.
3of Swiss origin (i.e. with the Swiss citizenship and at least one parent that
is/was Swiss by birth) at the time of the ﬁrst-wave interview in 1999; in
addition, we include workers who were not self-employed, not enrolled in ed-
ucation and reported valid information for the variables of interest (e.g. level
of occupation, gross hourly earnings, potential work experience). We con-
sider that, once a person drops out (because he/she does not reply to the
questionnaire, moves out of the labour force, becomes self-employed, starts
studying again or reports invalid information for the variables of interest),
he/she is out forever. Hence, we ignore any subsequent observations on in-
dividuals after they leave the sample (dropout is an absorbing state). Given
the relatively high attrition among selected individuals over time, we focus
the remainder of the analysis on the ﬁrst four waves of the panel (see Table 3
of the appendix for more details on the sample selection).3
In the literature, educational mismatch is measured as the diﬀerence be-
tween workers’ actual education and required education for their job. Three
methods are generally used for deﬁning required education, each of them pre-
senting arguments for and against (see, e.g., Hartog, 2000; Chevalier, 2003,
for critical overviews of each measurement method). The ﬁrst measure is ob-
tained from the job analysis method; according to this objective method, the
level of education required to perform a particular job is determined by a sys-
tematic job evaluation. However, this information is actually unavailable for
Switzerland. Second, some surveys include the worker’s self-assessment
of educational requirement; this subjective method consists in asking work-
ers directly how much education is required to get or do their job. But the
SHP survey does not provide such information. As a result, we are left with
the realized matches method that can always be implemented. There are
two main measures derived from this objective and statistical method. First,
the required education is deﬁned as a band around the mean level of edu-
cation within each occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989). Workers are
then overeducated (resp. undereducated) if their actual education expressed
in years diverges by more than one standard deviation above (resp. below)
the mean value for a given occupation. The required education can also be
3Hereafter, we only inspect whether our ﬁndings are sensitive to sample selection re-
sulting from attrition.
4established from the modal rather than the mean level of education (Kiker
et al., 1997). Accordingly, workers are overeducated (resp. undereducated)
if their educational attainment falls above (resp. below) the modal value for
a speciﬁc occupation.
As noted by Kiker et al. (1997) and Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000),
the standard deviation procedure has the disadvantage, with respect to the
modal measure, that it is more sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data.
In addition, it relies on the strong assumption of symmetry, while the modal
level of education within a particular occupation better reﬂects the potential
asymmetry of the distribution. Therefore, we derive required education from
the mode of workers’ actual educational attainment in each occupation, sep-
arately by survey year. The highest level of education achieved consists of
10 levels classiﬁed in an increasing hierarchical order; each educational level
is translated into the total number of years of schooling (see Table 4 of the
appendix). Moreover, we rely on the International Standard Classiﬁcation
of Occupations (ISCO) disaggregated on a 2-digit level with at least 10 ob-
servations in a year;4 this amounts to about thirty occupation levels. As we
show in Section 5, the main ﬁndings of the empirical analysis do not change
depending on whether we use (i) occupations disaggregated on a 3-digit level
or (ii) another conversion scale between levels and years of education.
3 Educational mismatch and wages
Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981) have proposed an extended version of the Min-
cer wage equation in which years of actual education Sa are decomposed
into years of required education Sr, years of overeducation So and years of
undereducation Su:
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where wit is the gross hourly wage for individual i at wave t,5  a constant
4Workers in occupations with less than 10 observations in a year are excluded from the
sample (see Table 3 of the appendix).
5Deﬂated into 2000 Swiss francs, gross hourly wages is obtained from the division of the
reported gross monthly wages to the reported number of hours worked per week multiplied
by 4.3 (weeks).
5term, Xit potential years of work experience (= year of interview - year
started working without prolonged interruption) and Gi a dummy variable
for gender (= 1 if worker is a woman). While Sr
it is simply derived from the










By construction, Sa = Sr + So   Su. Adequately educated workers earn a
return of r for years of required education. Overeduated workers receive a
return of r for years of required education plus a return of o for years of
surplus education. And undereducated workers get a return of r for years
of required education minus a return of u for years of deﬁcit education.
Two theoretical frameworks can be tested on the basis of Duncan and
Hoﬀman’s wage equation. First, the human capital hypothesis (Becker,
1964) implies this joint equality: r = o =  u. Accordingly, wages only
depend on worker’s characteristics and the Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁca-
tion simpliﬁes to the Mincer wage equation. Second, the job competition
hypothesis (Thurow, 1975) states that wages are entirely determined by re-
quired education: o = u = 0. In this case, workers’ characteristics do not
matter in the wage determination process. Most earlier studies do not give
support to these hypotheses (for the latest surveys of the empirical evidence
using the Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁcation, see McGuinness, 2006; Leuven
and Oosterbeek, 2011), in particular: (1) returns to overeducation are pos-
itive and lower than returns to required education, i.e. r > o > 0, (2)
returns to undereducation are negative and lower than returns to required
education in absolute value, i.e. u < 0 and r > juj. Compared to those
adequately educated, overeducated (resp. undereducated) workers earn less
(resp. more) for a given level of actual education but earn more (resp. less)
for a given level of occupation.
As most prior researches have relied on a cross-sectional estimation of
Duncan and Hoﬀman’s speciﬁcation and have then assumed that unobserved
heterogeneity (including ability, motivation and other unobserved character-
istics) is uncorrelated with educational mismatch, they are confronted with
the problem of omitted variable bias if this assumption fails to hold. Indeed,
the omission of unobserved heterogeneity may lead to an underestimation of
6the rate of return to overeducation if unobserved heterogeneity is negatively
correlated with overeducation; conversely, the rate of return to underedu-
cation is probably overestimated in case of a positive correlation between
unobserved heterogeneity and undereducation. Few studies have controlled
for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage
equation. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel data from 1984 to 1998,
Bauer (2002) has applied the ﬁxed eﬀects method. He has indicated that un-
observed heterogeneity explains a large part of the diﬀerence between returns
to required education and over/undereducation: in particular, the estimated
diﬀerences become smaller for men and totally disappear for women. On
the basis of the same estimation method, very diﬀerent results are reported
by Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) using data from Swedish Level of Living sur-
veys from 1974, 1981, 1991 and 2000. They have found that returns to
over/undereducation remain smaller in absolute value than the return to
required education after controlling for ﬁxed unobserved heterogeneity.6
In a ﬁxed eﬀects analysis, unobserved heterogeneity ci becomes part of
the disturbance term: it = ci +uit, where uit is the independent, identically
distributed error. The ﬁxed eﬀects method is attractive because it allows
for ci to be arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables. Indeed,
its main assumption is strict exogeneity of the covariates conditional on ci:
E[uitjxi1;xi2;:::;xiT;ci] = 0 for t = 1;:::;T, where xit is the vector of regres-
sors. However, the ﬁxed eﬀects method does not allow the estimation of
time-invariant variables and can lead to imprecise estimates if the key vari-
ables in xit do not vary much over time (cf Wooldridge, 2002). As noted by
Nielsen (2007), a ﬁxed eﬀects approach would only identify the returns to
educational mismatch from information on individuals who change their level
of education within the sample period. In fact, recall that Sa = Sr+So Su.
In case Sa is constant across time, the within-individual variation in Sr, So
and Su is characterized by perfect multicollinearity. Even with little longi-
6Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) have also applied the instrumental variables (IV) method in
odrer to address the problem of omitted variable bias. While their IV results give support
to the job competition hypothesis, the use of weak instruments is likely to cast doubt
on the robustess of their estimates. As pointed by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011), it is
indeed very diﬃcult to apply the IV method in the context of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage
equation, in particular to ﬁnd convincing instruments for educational mismatch.
7tudinal variation in Sa, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation remains problematic. As
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator only makes use of the within-individual variation
in the sample, this leads to ineﬃcient estimates of the returns to over-, re-
quired and undereducation. According to Plümper and Troeger (2007), the
ineﬃciency of the ﬁxed eﬀects model results from the fact that it disregards
the between variation and, thus, does not take all the available information
into account. While Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) do not present any informa-
tion about between and within variations of actual education, Bauer (2002)
displays this information. As expected, variation across individuals is much
larger than variation within individuals: the ratio of the between standard
deviation of actual education to the within standard deviation of the same
variable is ranging between 7.35 (for women) and 8.68 (for men). The high
values of this ratio cast doubt on whether the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the
returns to educational mismatch could be identiﬁed.
Actual education is time-constant in our sample since we exclude individ-
uals enrolled in education (i.e. Sa
it = Sa
i for all t). How can we reconcile the
variation need of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator and the time-invariant nature of
actual education? In order to address the aforementioned problem of identiﬁ-
cation, we use a simpliﬁed version of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s model proposed
by Rumberger (1987) in which years of overeducation and years of undered-
ucation are restricted to have a symmetric eﬀects on wages (i.e. u =  o):
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The use of this speciﬁcation is motivated by the two latest meta-analyses of
studies estimating Duncan and Hoﬀman’s model (Rubb, 2003; Leuven and
Oosterbeek, 2011); they have demonstrated that the returns associated with
overeducation and undereducation are in nature close to symmetry. Rubb’s
main message about the average returns to over-, required, undereducation
computed on the basis of 85 wage estimates is stated as follows (p. 621):7
“on average, the literature ﬁnds that the premium paid for overeducation is
approximately equal to the penalty for undereducation, but lower than the
7Rubb (2003) does not provide any information about the estimation methods used in
the selected studies; however, it is likely that the return estimates are mainly obtained
from the ordinary least squares regression.
8returns associated with an increase in required education.” Based on approx-
imately 150 studies,8 Leuven and Oosterbeek’s descriptive results reinforce
Rubb’s statement (p. 30): “the return to a year of required schooling is around
0.09, to a year of overschooling more or less half of that, and a year of under-
schooling results in a wage penalty of again around half of the return to a re-
quired year of schooling.” It should be noted that the ﬁndings of Rubb (2003)
and Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) are probably biased since most studies in-
cluded in their meta-analyses have neglected unobserved heterogeneity when
estimating the Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, the hypoth-
esis of symmetric returns to overeducation and undereducation is crucial for
our identiﬁcation strategy, given that the use of Rumberger’s wage equation
allows the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator to exploit the within-individual variation in
required education.
We can rearrange Rumberger’s wage equation as
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where  corresponds to the diﬀerential rate of return between required ed-
ucation and educational mismatch. The identiﬁcation of this coeﬃcient is
possible with ﬁxed eﬀects since Sr varies over time. Preview hypotheses are
restated according to this last equation: while the human capital hypothesis
requires r   o = 0, the formal test of the job competition hypothesis sim-
pliﬁes to o = 0. Equation 1 is estimated using [i] the Pooled Ordinary Least
Squares with robust standard errors and [ii] diﬀerent panel data estimation
methods, where it = ci + uit. We consider two panel data models:
 Random Eﬀects
While this model allows coeﬃcients on time-constant explanatory vari-
ables to be identiﬁed, its main shortcoming is the strong assumption
that unobserved heterogeneity is independent from covariates. As with
pooled ordinary least squares, the random eﬀects regression model in-
cludes all the time-invariant and time-varying covariates, and three
dummies for the second, third and fourth waves.
8Contrary to Rubb (2003), Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) include a small number of
studies using instrumental variables (4 estimation results) and ﬁxed eﬀects (5 estimation
results).
9 Fixed Eﬀects
This model is more appropriate to estimate the wage eﬀects of educa-
tional mismatch since it allows for correlation between unobserved het-
erogeneity and covariates; but estimation of time-invariant explanatory
variables is not possible as the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator needs individuals’
variation over time. Thus, only the time-varying controls are consid-
ered (i.e. required education, potential work experience and potential
work experience squared).9
All the explanatory variables are presented in Table 5, while descriptive sam-
ple statistics are presented in Table 6 (see the appendix). Since identiﬁcation
in ﬁxed eﬀects analysis relies on within-individual variation, suﬃcient vari-
ation in Sr within workers is needed in order to obtain precise estimates.
Between and within standard deviations are displayed in Table 6. Even if
most of the variance in the modal measure of Sr is due to diﬀerences across
workers, there is also substantial variance within workers. In fact, the within
standard deviation is close to 50 percent of the between standard deviation.
Hence, our identiﬁcation strategy based on suﬃcient variations in Sr appears
valid.
4 Results
Regression results from equation 1 are displayed in Table 1; pooled ordinary
least squares (POLS), ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) and random eﬀects (RE) estimates
are presented in the ﬁrst, second and third columns, respectively.
POLS results show that the diﬀerential rate of return between required
education and educational mismatch (r  o) and the return to educational
mismatch (o) are both of them signiﬁcantly positive: workers earn a return
of 0.073 (= 0.017 + 0.056) for a year of required education and a positive
return of 0.056 for a year of surplus education (i.e. a negative return of -0.056
for a year of deﬁcit education). Hence, these estimates are fully consistent
with most earlier studies according to which the human capital and job com-
petition hypotheses are rejected, given that the return to overeducation is
9The wave dummies and the potential experience variable are perfectly linearly related,
so the wave dummies are excluded in ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
10Table 1: Wage returns to educational mismatch: Regression results
POLS FE RE
r   o 0.017** 0.001 0.013**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
o 0.056** - 0.058**
(0.003) (0.004)
Observations 3,474 3,474 3,474
Number of i 1,152 1,152 1,152
Adjusted R2 0.245
Overall R2 0.0785 0.247
Hausman test 14.34**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.80
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst
wave are omitted in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect
to the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis. Required education is measured with the
mode procedure. Additional controls are unreported; full regression
results are reported in Table 7 of the appendix.
positive and lower than the return to required education, i.e. r   o > 0
and o > 0.
The rejection of the Hausman test implies that the RE model is incon-
sistent for estimating the wages returns to educational mismatch since un-
observed heterogeneity is correlated with covariates. Therefore, we focus our
attention on the FE estimates. This method indicates that the diﬀerential
rate of return between required education and educational mismatch is no
more signiﬁcant, i.e. r   o = 0. Moreover, this result emphasizes that
there is no evidence against the human capital hypothesis. Consequently,
omitted variable bias seems to explain the entire diﬀerence between returns
to required education and educational mismatch.
Given that our ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are based on an unbalanced panel
data set, it is important to determine if sample selection due to attrition is
present. As our longitudinal sample is set up in a way such that attrition
11is an absorbing state, one way to test for attrition bias is to add a lead
of selection indicator (si;t+1)10 as an additional regressor in the ﬁxed eﬀects
analysis and test for signiﬁcance using a t test (Wooldridge, 2002). The result
of this procedure (presented at the bottom of Table 1) show that the lead
variable is not signiﬁcant (t statistic corresponds to -0.80), meaning there
is no evidence of attrition bias. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
sample selection is not an issue in our ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
5 Robustness checks
In this section, we wonder whether our ﬁndings rest on the speciﬁc measure
of required education that we adopt when estimating equation 1. Recall that
required education is measured with the mode procedure, on the basis of the
CNEF conversion scale between levels and years of education (cf Table 4)
and occupations disaggregated on a 2-digit level.
The most obvious alternative is the measure derived from the mean pro-
cedure. Accordingly, required education corresponds to the mean value of
workers’ educational attainment for their occupation. However, in order to
satisfy Sa = Sr + So   Su, required education needs to be equal to work-
ers’ actual education for those adequately educated (i.e. in case their actual
education is within plus or minus one standard deviation of the mean edu-
cation for their occupation) given that So = 0 and Su = 0. The between
and within standard deviations for this variable are reported in the last row
of Table 6 (see the appendix). The identiﬁcation of the parameter of in-
terest (r   o) should not be an issue since the mean-based measure of
required education shows some variation across time: its within standard
deviation represents 1=3 of its between standard deviation. All the estimates
of Table 1 are re-derived in Table 2 by replacing the mode-based measure of
required education by the mean-based measure in equation 1. The results
are qualitatively similar and thus conﬁrm our main conclusion: returns to
required education and educational mismatch become equal after controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity.
10Let sit be a binary selection indicator for individual i at wave t: sit = 1 if (xit;lnwit)
is observed, and zero otherwise.
12Table 2: Wage returns to educational mismatch: Additional results
POLS FE RE
r   o 0.032** 0.003 0.025**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
o 0.047** - 0.051**
(0.004) (0.005)
Observations 3,474 3,474 3,474
Number of i 1,152 1,152 1,152
Adjusted R2 0.250
Overall R2 0.0813 0.251
Hausman test 17.89**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.80
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst
wave are omitted in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect
to the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis. Required education is measured with the
mean procedure. Additional controls are unreported; full regression
results are reported in Table 8 of the appendix.
Additional robustness checks consist in assessing the sensitivity of the es-
timates when we consider for the measurement of required education either
a more detailed classiﬁcation of occupations (i.e. disaggregated on a 3-digit
level) or an alternative conversion scale between levels and years of educa-
tion. For instance, Weber (2010) have proposed a conversion scale according
to which an individual needs to spent 13 years (instead of 12 years) to get
a high school degree while a certiﬁcate from a technical or vocational school
is obtained after 14 years (instead of 15 years). We re-estimate equation 1
in which the mode- or mean-based measures of required education are com-
puted using this alternative conversion scale or the 3-digit ISCO code. The
estimation results are presented from Table 9 to Table 11 (see the appendix).
All the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the diﬀerential rate of return between re-
quired education and educational mismatch remain statistically indiﬀerent
from zero. They are again qualitatively similar to previous estimates, indi-
13cating that our results are robust to various ways of deriving the statistical
measure of required education.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to solve the problem of omitted hetero-
geneity bias when estimating the wage returns to required education, overe-
ducation and undereducation. We have used data from the Swiss Household
Panel whose longitudinal aspect allows us to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity by means of ﬁxed eﬀects. While a few studies have also applied
this method (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009), they have neglected the
fact that suﬃcient variations in actual education within workers are needed
to identify the returns to required education, overeducation and underedu-
cation. This paper distinguishes from these studies since our identiﬁcation
strategy exploits the within-individual variation in required education in-
stead. After rearranging the wage equation proposed by Rumberger (1987)
that implicitly recognizes a symmetric relationship between overeducation
and undereducation, the parameter of interest is indeed associated with re-
quired education: it measures the diﬀerential rate of return between required
education and educational mismatch.
Based on the strong assumption that educational mismatch is uncor-
related with unobserved heterogeneity, estimating the wage returns to re-
quired education, overeducation and undereducation by pooled ordinary least
squares produces results in line with the literature: the return to overedu-
cation is positive and lower than the return to required education. In other
words, overeducated workers earn more than their adequately educated co-
workers but less than those adequately educated with the same level of educa-
tion. The reverse reasoning applies to undereducated workers, since years of
overeducation and years of undereducation are supposed to have symmetric
eﬀects on wages. However, the ﬁxed eﬀects results show that pooled ordinary
least squares method is consistent with omitted heterogeneity bias. Indeed,
once the sources of time constant unobserved heterogeneity are controlled
for, the wage returns associated with overeducation and undereducation are
downward and upward biased, respectively, in pooled ordinary least squares.
14Returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation are then
equally rewarded as human capital hypothesis suggests. This interpreta-
tion of the Swiss labour market is consistent with the observed fact that
Switzerland has a ﬂexible labour market keeping the rate of human resource
utilization high (OECD, 2000).
Two possible further modiﬁcations of this paper would be as follows.
First, we have assumed that the required education variable was strictly ex-
ogenous conditional on unobserved heterogeneity; however if this variable
is correlated with the i.i.d. error in some time period, ﬁxed eﬀects are in-
consistent and may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, one possibility for
improvement would be to apply ﬁrst diﬀerencing and ﬁnd convincing instru-
ments for required education, the latter of which is far from simple. Second,
the estimated speciﬁcation hinges on the assumption that the returns to
overeducation and undereducation are symmetrical. Even if the latest meta-
analyses of studies on educational mismatch have agreed with this statement,
it would be worth testing the robustness of our ﬁndings on the basis of a more
ﬂexible relationship between overeducation and undereducation.
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18Table 4: CNEF conversion scale between levels and years of education
Description Years of
schooling
Primary and lower secondary level
Compulsory school, elementary vocational training 9
Domestic science course, 1 year school of commerce 10
Upper secondary level
General training school 12
Apprenticeship 12
Full-time vocational school 12
Maturity (high school) 12
Tertiary level
Technical or vocational school 15
Higher vocational college 15
University 18
PhD 21
Source: Codebook for CNEF variables in the SHP (2009).
Table 5: Explanatory variables included in the empirical analysis
Continuous variable Dummy variable Ref.
Years of actual education (Sa) Gender
Men 
Years of required education (Sr) Femme
Potential experience Wave/Year
(= year of interview - year since started 1/1999 
working without prolonged interruption) 2/2000
3/2001
Potential experience squared 4/2002
Source: Swiss Household Panel.
19Table 6: Individual characteristics: Summary statistics
Wave/Year 1/1999 2/2000 3/2001 4/2002 Total
Gi (women)
Mean 0.479 0.479 0.491 0.479 0.482




Mean 16.361 17.361 18.534 19.084 17.492




Mean 3.197 3.312 3.477 3.363 3.316




Mean 13.160 13.160 13.305 13.453 13.227




Mean 12.779 12.786 13.168 13.185 12.915




Mean 12.936 12.942 13.292 13.351 13.065
Overall S.D. 1.677 1.698 2.032 2.066 1.823
Between S.D. 1.688
Within S.D. 0.554
Observations 1,152 1,152 742 428 3,474
Source: Swiss Household Panel 1999-2002, data are unweighted.
20Table 7: Full regression results: Sr measured with the mode procedure
POLS FE RE
r   o 0.017** 0.001 0.013**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
o 0.056** - 0.058**
(0.003) (0.004)
1 0.020** 0.051** 0.022**
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
2 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 -0.102** - -0.100**
(0.014) (0.021)
Constant -0.065 0.521** -0.053
(0.055) (0.122) (0.070)
Wave dummies yes no yes
Observations 3,474 3,474 3,474
Number of i 1,152 1,152 1,152
Adjusted R2 0.245
Overall R2 0.0785 0.247
Hausman test 14.34**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.80
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst
wave are omitted in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect to
the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
21Table 8: Full regression results: Sr measured with the mean procedure
POLS FE RE
r   o 0.032** 0.003 0.025**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
o 0.047** - 0.051**
(0.004) (0.005)
1 0.020** 0.051** 0.022**
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
2 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 -0.101** - -0.100**
(0.014) (0.021)
Constant -0.138** 0.501** -0.114
(0.055) (0.140) (0.072)
Wave dummies yes no yes
Observations 3,474 3,474 3,474
Number of i 1,152 1,152 1,152
Adjusted R2 0.250
Overall R2 0.0813 0.251
Hausman test 17.89**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.80
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst
wave are omitted in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect to
the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
22Table 9: Robustness checks: In order to measure required education, oc-
cupations are disaggregated on a 2-digit level and another conversion scale
between levels and years of education is used (cf Weber, 2010)
Mode Mean
POLS FE RE POLS FE RE
r   o 0.016** -0.007 0.012** 0.036** 0.015 0.031**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
o 0.060** - 0.063** 0.050** - 0.054**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
1 0.021** 0.051** 0.023** 0.021** 0.050** 0.022**
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
2 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 -0.109** - -0.107** -0.110** - -0.108**
(0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020)
Constant -0.115** 0.623** -0.109 -0.238** 0.362** -0.236**
(0.051) (0.139) (0.068) (0.058) (0.147) (0.073)
Wave dummies yes no yes yes no yes
Observations 3,474 3,474 3,474 3,474 3,474 3,474
Number of i 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.265
Overall R2 0.0687 0.260 0.0987 0.266
Hausman test 19.98** 12.71**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.78 -0.87
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst wave are omitted
in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect to the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
23Table 10: Robustness checks: In order to measure required education, occu-
pations are disaggregated on a 3-digit level and the CNEF conversion scale
between levels and years of education is used (cf Table 4)
Mode Mean
POLS FE RE POLS FE RE
r   o 0.014** -0.003 0.012** 0.031** -0.008 0.026**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006)
o 0.058** - 0.059** 0.047** - 0.050**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
1 0.020** 0.054** 0.022** 0.020** 0.054** 0.021**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
2 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 -0.112** - -0.110** -0.110** - -0.108**
(0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022)
Constant -0.023 0.550** -0.030 -0.112** 0.613** -0.102
(0.053) (0.159) (0.072) (0.054) (0.187) (0.074)
Wave dummies yes no yes yes no yes
Observations 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153
Number of i 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.251
Overall R2 0.0727 0.246 0.0653 0.252
Hausman test 15.61** 21.90**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.80 -0.79
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst wave are omitted
in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect to the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
24Table 11: Robustness checks: In order to measure required education, oc-
cupations are disaggregated on a 3-digit level and another conversion scale
between levels and years of education is used (cf Weber, 2010)
Mode Mean
POLS FE RE POLS FE RE
r   o 0.010** -0.000 0.009* 0.030** 0.002 0.025**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
o 0.065** - 0.066** 0.053** - 0.057**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
1 0.021** 0.054** 0.023** 0.020** 0.054** 0.022**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
2 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 -0.116** - -0.114** -0.117** - -0.114**
(0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
Constant -0.086 0.520** -0.102 -0.180** 0.495** -0.178**
(0.054) (0.156) (0.072) (0.057) (0.187) (0.075)
Wave dummies yes no yes yes no yes
Observations 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153
Number of i 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.264
Overall R2 0.0752 0.260 0.0777 0.265
Hausman test 12.77** 14.88**
t test: si;t+1 = 0 -0.81 -0.76
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors.
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Household Panel, four waves from 1999 to 2002.
Notes: Data are unweighted. Individuals surveyed only once at the ﬁrst wave are omitted
in order to obtain comparable estimates with respect to the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
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